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Abstract 
We empirically investigate whether a bank’s decision to recapitalize is influenced by its 
ownership characteristics, particularly the separation between voting and cash-flow rights of 
the bank's ultimate owner. We use a novel hand-collected dataset on bank ultimate control 
and ownership structure of 442 European commercial banks to estimate an ownership-
augmented capital adjustment model. We find that when the ultimate owner’s voting and 
cash-flow rights are identical, banks actively (as opposed to passively shifting earnings to 
capital stock) and equally adjust their capital upwards (i.e. raise equity) and downwards (i.e. 
repurchase equity) to reach their target level. However, a gap between voting and cash-flow 
rights of the ultimate owner makes banks reluctant to actively adjust their capital position 
upwards, presumably because they fear control dilution. Further investigation shows that such 
a behavior is more pronounced if the ultimate owner is a family or a state, or if the bank is 
headquartered in a country with weak shareholder protection. Our findings have several 
policy implications on the road to the final stage of Basel III in 2019.   
JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32 
Keywords: Ownership structure, pyramids, regulatory bank capital, European banking, 
adjustment speed, voting rights, cash-flow rights 
 
*Corresponding author. Tel: + 33 5 55 14 92 51 
E-mail addresses: laetitia.lepetit@unilim.fr (L. Lepetit), amine.tarazi@unilim.fr (A. Tarazi), 
nadia.zedek@unilim.fr (N. Zedek)  
  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2080459
- 2 - 
 
1 Introduction  
Bank capital plays a central role in bank regulation. The global financial crisis triggered in 
2007 has led the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 2010a) to strengthen the 
existing capital requirements and to improve the quality of regulatory capital. The definition 
of Tier 1 regulatory capital has been narrowed by excluding preference shares that were 
included in the previous (Basel II) definition of Tier 1 capital. To comply with these new 
regulatory capital requirements, banks need to raise their equity capital or reduce their scale. 
Although banks usually hold regulatory capital buffers (i.e. above the minimum requirements) 
these changes raise an important question: how do banks adjust their capital depending on 
their control and ownership structure? We specifically question how control and ownership 
structure, namely the gap between voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner, affect 
the bank’s decision to adjust toward target capital.    
It is well known that banks are often reluctant to raise equity capital. The arguments 
provided by the existing theoretical and empirical literature regarding the reluctance of banks 
to recapitalize focus on the costs related to raising equity. According to the pecking-order 
theory, issuing new equity in the context of asymmetric information signals bad news to the 
market (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This may lead to share price reductions affecting the bank’s 
economic value negatively. Accordingly, banks rely more on internal funds and raise equity in 
last resort. Altinkihc and Hansen (2000) also report higher transaction costs for equity 
issuance (5.38% of the issue proceeds versus 1.09% for debt). Furthermore, increasing equity 
requires a time delay which impedes immediate recapitalization (Peura & Keppo, 2006). 
During this delay, banks might breach the minimum capital requirements. Hence, banks face 
high costs due to increased regulatory intervention and surveillance (Peek & Rosengren, 
1997), as well as liquidation and financial distress costs including the loss of charter value 
(Keeley, 1990). Because of these adjustment costs, banks hold capital buffers and are likely to 
adjust their capital ratios by modifying the size of their balance sheet. The empirical literature 
on how banks manage their capital ratios provides ambiguous results. Ivashina & Scharfstein 
(2010) show that banks preferred to cut their risky assets (new lending) instead of issuing new 
equity during the 2008 financial crisis. Laderman (1994) finds that undercapitalized bank 
holding companies decrease asset growth rather than issue new common stock, because 
issuing new equity reduces shareholders’ wealth. Jacques and Nigro (1997) find that severely 
undercapitalized banks increase their capital ratios by mainly reducing portfolio asset risk 
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because they face higher recapitalization costs. Conversely, Rime (2001) finds that Swiss 
banks adjusted their regulatory risk-based capital ratios by increasing capital rather than 
reducing asset risk due to the absence of a developed market for asset-backed securities in 
Switzerland.  
While there is a very large strand of literature that investigates why banks avoid 
recapitalization, research on the driving forces behind banks’ decision to recapitalize is 
relatively scarce. Managers/controlling shareholders may adapt their financing policies to 
inflate their voting power and avoid the dilution of their control rights ((Stulz, 1988), (Harris 
& Raviv, 1988)). Other studies investigate how firms choose between different equity issue 
methods (for instance rights offerings and private placements). They find that family-
controlled firms favor rights offerings to avoid control threats (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2005). 
Focusing on banking firms, Hyun and Rhee (2011) theoretically show that if a bank’s decision 
to recapitalize is made by existing powerful shareholders, it will satisfy the higher capital ratio 
by reducing risky assets (especially loans) rather than by issuing new shares. Banks are 
therefore likely to reduce loans in order to avoid ownership dilution of the existing 
shareholders.  
In our study, we build on the law and finance theory (La Porta et al., 1998) and 
empirically test whether ownership characteristics affect the banks’ decision to recapitalize. 
More precisely, we focus on the separation between voting and cash-flow rights of the 
ultimate owner and examine whether banks controlled by a shareholder with and without 
deviation between both rights behave differently in adjusting their capital ratios. The 
performance of banks depends on the extent of the deviation between voting and cash-flow 
rights (Azofra & Santamaria, 2011) and therefore banks' capital ratios might fluctuate and 
adjust to their optimal levels differently. A controlling shareholder without deviation between 
both rights is more oriented toward profit maximization and consequently has stronger 
incentives to force the bank to adjust its capital ratio and maintain it at its optimal level, 
regardless of the potential control and ownership dilution costs that may arise from 
recapitalization. Conversely, a controlling shareholder with deviation between both rights is 
more oriented to reap private benefits of control ((Bebchuk et al., 2000), (Claessens et al., 
2002)). Hence, we conjecture that a controlling shareholder with deviation between both 
rights is more averse to control dilution leading her/him to curb recapitalization that could 
dilute her/his controlling position by allowing a new shareholder’s entry that may contest 
her/his current voting power.      
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We contribute to the existing literature in several directions. First, we compile new data 
on ultimate control and ownership structure of 442 commercial banks across 17 European 
countries. Unlike previous studies ((Caprio et al., 2007), (Laeven & Levine, 2009)), we 
include both publicly listed and privately owned banks. We then compute the ultimate 
owner’s voting and cash-flow rights following La Porta et al. (1999) and disentangle between 
shareholders with and without separation between both rights. Second, we examine whether 
such a separation affects a bank’s decision to recapitalize, a question which to our knowledge 
has not been addressed before. For this purpose, we adapt a capital adjustment model used in 
the literature and test for potential asymmetries in the adjustment speed toward long term 
capital targets. Such asymmetries could possibly be the outcome of differences in 
control/ownership dilution costs depending on the presence or absence of a gap between 
ultimate owners’ voting and cash-flow rights. Hence, we contribute to the literature1 
investigating differences in adjustment speeds by considering the impact of control/ownership 
dilution costs beyond the well documented costs (transaction, asymmetric information and 
regulatory costs). Third, by focusing on Europe we are able to draw policy implications for 
bank regulators. Deviation between voting and cash-flow rights is more acute in Europe 
compared to other countries (for instance the U.S.) with more diffused ownership (La Porta et 
al., 1998). We hence carry out a study on European regulatory bank capital and provide 
another driving factor behind the reluctance of banks to raise equity: ownership structure. 
Finally, we contribute to the recent regulatory debate regarding the limitation of Tier 1 
regulatory capital to ordinary shares and draw potential implications.  
Our key findings are as follows. On the one hand, banks controlled by a shareholder 
without separation between voting and cash-flow rights equally adjust their capital upwards 
and downwards and do not appear to fear control dilution. On the other hand, banks controlled 
through a gap between both rights adjust their capital downwards identically to banks without 
such a gap but are reluctant to actively adjust their capital position upwards. This finding 
suggests that banks controlled through separation between both rights fear control dilution 
and consequently curb recapitalization. Furthermore, we find that the fear of control dilution 
is more pronounced if the shareholder is a family or a state or when the bank is established in 
a country with weak shareholder protection.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present our research 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, defines ownership variables and provides some 
                                                          
1
 See (Flannery & Rangan, 2006), (Berger et al., 2008), (Jokipii & Milne, 2011), (Memmel & Raupach, 2010) and (Byoun, 2008).  
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descriptive statistics. In section 4, we specify the model used to test our hypotheses. Section 5 
provides estimation results. In section 6, we carry out some extensions and perform 
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.   
2 Research hypotheses   
In this paper, we build on two strands of the literature: the bank capital ratio adjustment 
literature and the corporate governance and ownership structure literature. 
Banks face a trade-off when they choose the appropriate level of their capital ratios. On 
the one hand, banks have to hold a minimum level to comply with regulatory requirements 
and to satisfy market participants (market discipline). On the other hand, banks are also 
expected to maximize the return to shareholders. This leads them to a target capital ratio. 
Previous studies find evidence of such a target and argue that bank capital ratios do not 
fluctuate randomly ((Memmel & Raupach, 2010), (Berger et al., 2008), (Flannery & Rangan, 
2008)). However, positive (negative) random shocks may affect bank capital ratios leading to 
positive (negative) deviations of the capital ratio from the target level. Consequently, bank 
management is expected to periodically adjust the capital ratio. When a positive exogenous 
shock leads to a positive deviation of the current capital ratio from its target value, bank 
insiders will decrease the current capital ratio to adjust to the target. This can be achieved via 
a combination of equity repurchase, an increase in dividend payment, or an upward 
adjustment in asset size (or in risk-weighted assets). In the event of a negative shock the bank 
will need to issue new equity, decrease its dividend payment, or decrease its asset size (or 
risk-weighted assets). For the controlling shareholder recapitalization (equity issues) may 
dilute both the control and cash-flow (dividend) rights whereas equity repurchase may 
reinforce both rights. We therefore expect that the behavior of banks in terms of capital 
adjustment will be influenced by their control/ownership characteristics. Hence, beyond the 
costs highlighted in the literature (transaction, asymmetric information and regulatory costs), 
we conjecture that banks will also consider potential control and/or ownership dilution costs 
against operating with a suboptimal capital ratio (below or above the target capital ratio). 
Using the law and finance theory (La Porta et al., 1998), we consider in our analysis two 
kinds of shareholders that may potentially behave differently when capital levels move above 
or below their target level. Many studies focus on the separation between voting and cash-
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flow rights of the controlling shareholder2. A shareholder may control/hold a company 
without any discrepancy between voting (i.e. the right to control) and cash-flow (i.e. the right 
to earn dividends) rights. However, pyramidal ownership structures, dual class shares and 
cross-holding mechanisms allow large shareholders to exercise effective control over a 
company with a relatively small stake of cash-flow rights (Bebchuk et al., 2000), i.e. control 
the company with a large gap between voting and cash-flow rights.  
Previous studies argue that firms controlled by a shareholder without separation between 
voting and cash-flow rights exhibit higher performance ((Azofra & Santamaria, 2011), 
(Claessens et al., 2002)). Thus, a shareholder without separation between both rights has 
stronger incentives to achieve better performance and is more likely to timely adjust the 
bank's capital closely to its optimal level. Such a shareholder is expected to adjust the capital 
ratio in both directions: upwards (i.e. equity issues) and downwards (equity repurchases). In 
addition, such a shareholder may have lower incentives to curb recapitalization through new 
equity issue because the positive effect of recapitalization (moving to the target capital ratio) 
might outweigh its potential negative effect (loss in dividends).  
Hypothesis 1.a (H1.a): Banks controlled by a shareholder with equal voting and cash-flow 
rights adjust their capital regardless of their initial position; i.e. above (equity repurchase) or 
below (equity issue) the target capital ratio.  
Hypothesis 1.b (H1.b): When there is no difference between the ultimate owner’s voting and 
cash-flow rights, upward and downward equity adjustments are identical. Such a shareholder 
equally weighs equity issues and repurchases.  
A broad literature argues that deviation between voting and cash-flow rights leads to 
poorer performance. This is due to the ability of the controlling shareholder to expropriate 
minority shareholders without bearing the financial costs of expropriation 3 ((Azofra & 
Santamaria, 2011), (Claessens et al., 2002)). Thus, a controlling shareholder with separation 
between both rights is less oriented toward profit achievement and is consequently expected 
to have lower incentives to adjust the bank's capital ratios and operate with a target. 
Furthermore, such a shareholder will differently weigh equity issues and repurchases. It could 
be argued that, to raise equity capital, such a shareholder could provide the required equity 
                                                          
2
 See (La Porta et al., 1999), (Claessens et al., 2000), (Claessens et al., 2002), (Faccio & Lang, 2002), (Almeida 
& Wolfenzon, 2006), (Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010), (Almeida et al., 2011), (Anon., n.d.), (Azofra & Santamaria, 
2011)… 
3
 Many studies argue that expropriation is costly (Maury & Pajuste, 2005), (La Porta et al., 2002), (Burkart et al., 
1998). 
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itself or take it from any entity she/he controls in the pyramid (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006). 
However, this may increase the proportion of cash-flow rights held in the bank leading to high 
expropriation costs ((La Porta et al., 2002), (Maury & Pajuste, 2005)). Furthermore, entities 
located at the bottom of the pyramid, i.e. with deviation between control and ownership, are 
generally less profitable (Almeida et al., 2011). This may reduce the controlling shareholder’s 
incentives to increase-by providing new equity- her/his cash-flow rights in such entities. The 
other option to recapitalize is to issue new equity to outsiders. However, this may dilute both 
the control and dividend rights of the controlling shareholder if she/he has lower cash-flow 
rights than voting rights. Assuming that recapitalization is made by issuing common shares 
that provide one share one vote, ownership dilution is less constraining for such a shareholder 
since her/his ownership share is in general very small. For example, in the case of Spain, 
Azofra and Santamaria (2011) find that whenever there is a gap between voting and cash-flow 
rights of the controlling shareholder, her/his cash-flow rights reach on average only 17% 
while the voting rights rise to 81%. In contrast, the dilution of voting rights is more 
troublesome. The entry of a new shareholder with a considerable voting power could contest 
the current controlling shareholder. The literature distinguishes two potential situations. First, 
if the new shareholder colludes4 with the current controlling shareholder to expropriate 
minority shareholders ((Shleifer & Wolfenzon 2002), (Laeven & Levine, 2008)), the latter 
would have to share with the former the diverted resources that she/he would have solely 
pocketed in the absence of the new shareholder. Second, if the new shareholder monitors the 
current controlling shareholder ((Maury & Pajuste 2005), (Pagano & Röell, 1998), 
(Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 2000), (Gomes & Novaes, 2001)), the latter would not be able to 
divert resources as easily as before. In any case, the current shareholder has something to lose 
and her/his loss will not be offset by the positive outcomes of recapitalization (moving to the 
target level) as her/his cash-flow rights are very limited in the bank. If such banks feel the 
need to adjust their capital ratios because of extra pressure from regulators or from the 
market, it might be optimal for them to increase their capital ratios by selling assets instead of 
raising equity.   
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Banks with and without divergence between voting and cash-flow rights 
behave identically when they face a surplus in capital: the downward adjustment speed toward 
the target is the same for both types of banks.  
                                                          
4
 The literature on complex ownership structures argues that coalitions may increase the efficiency of 
expropriation by reducing expropriation cost (Maury & Pajuste, 2005). However, the resulting benefit from 
increased expropriation efficiency might not always compensate the loss in the diverted share for the current 
controlling shareholder.  
- 8 - 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): When there is divergence between voting and cash-flow rights, the 
adjustment speed toward the target capital is asymmetric: slow if the bank needs to raise 
equity and fast if it has to decrease equity. 
3 Data, Ultimate Ownership Variables and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1 Sample  
Our sample covers 442 commercial banks across 17 Western European countries5. Data 
on bank balance sheets and income statements come from Bankscope while data on bank 
ultimate ownership and control are collected from several sources: Bankscope, Amadeus and 
annual reports. We also use the World Bank database to collect our macroeconomic 
indicators. We identify in Bankscope 1533 commercial banks for which income statements 
and balance sheets are provided for the 2002–2010 period. We use consolidated data but also 
refer to unconsolidated statements when consolidated data are not available. Among these 
1533 commercial banks, information on risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio was missing for 1047 
banks. This leaves us with 486 commercial banks. We further delete 8 banks for which the 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio is greater than 40%. We also omit 8 other banks involved in 
mergers and acquisitions6. Hence, we end up with a sample of 470 commercial banks. We 
then move to construct the control chains of these banks.  
3.2 Building of Control Chains  
Based on this sample of 470 banks, we gather data on bank ultimate control/ownership. 
We start by collecting information on direct ownership from Bankscope. For incomplete 
information or information not available in Bankscope, we search in annual reports. We 
classify a bank as a controlled bank if it has at least one shareholder with direct voting rights 
that sum up to 10% or more7. This control level is used because it provides a significant 
threshold of votes and most of our sample countries mandate disclosure of at least 5% of 
ownership8. In addition, this control level is more accurate in the case of banks due to greater 
                                                          
5
 These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
6
 We identify all banks for which total asset growth rate is greater than 35%. Then we check in Bankscope if 
such a bank experienced a merger-acquisition event. This applies to 8 banks.  
7
 As a robustness check, we carry out the same analysis by considering 20% as a control threshold.  
8 For example in France, Germany and Spain, owners that hold more than 5% must disclose their identity. The 
disclosure threshold is 2% in Italy and 3% in the United Kingdom. 
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diffusion of ownership compared to non-financial firms ((Prowse 1995), (Faccio & Lang, 
2002)). Out of 470 commercial banks, we have 40 banks that are widely-held (i.e. no 
shareholder controls 10% or more) and 430 are controlled banks. To build the control chains, 
we focus on these 430 controlled banks. If the controlling shareholder is independent, i.e. 
she/he is not controlled by another shareholder, we consider her/him as the ultimate owner of 
the votes. If, however, the controlling shareholders identified at this stage are themselves 
corporations, we continue the process and identify large shareholders (control 10% or more) 
in these corporations until we find the ultimate owners of the votes. We are not able to 
complete the full process for 28 banks because of lack of data. Hence, we end up with a final 
sample of 442 commercial banks. Most of our data on ownership structure are for 2007 and 
2008. We occasionally use observations from 2005, 2006, 2009 and 20109. Previous studies 
argue that ownership patterns are relatively stable over time ((La Porta et al., 1999), (Caprio 
et al., 2007), (Laeven & Levine, 2008)). We therefore do not view this as a serious 
shortcoming to perform our analysis where the focus is on a dummy variable that captures the 
presence or absence of a gap between control and ownership (control-ownership wedge). 
Once we get our control chains, we classify the ultimate owners of the controlled banks into 
four main categories: BANK if the ultimate owner is a widely-held bank, FAMILY if the 
ultimate owner is an individual or a family, STATE if the ultimate owner is a state or a public 
authority, and finally the category OTHER which includes the other types of ultimate owners 
(Industrial firm, financial and insurance companies, Mutual and Pension funds, Foundations 
and Research institutes, Managers and finally Cross-holdings) 10.  
Table 1 presents the distribution of European commercial banks by country as well as the 
representativeness of our final sample. To assess the representativeness of our sample, we 
compare the aggregate total assets of sample banks in a given country to the aggregate assets 
of all the banks covered by Bankscope in the same country. On average our final sample 
accounts for more than 50% of total bank assets in every country except for Austria 
(43%).Table 2 presents some general descriptive statistics for both the full sample available in 
Bankscope and our final sample. It shows no major differences between the two samples.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
                                                          
9
 Observations on ownership are respectively 48%, 29%, 11%, 6%, 4% and 2% for 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2006 and 2005.  
10
 We consider the classification provided in Bankscope.   
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3.3 Measuring Ultimate Ownership  
To investigate the potential asymmetries in the dynamics of bank capital depending on the 
presence or the absence of control-ownership deviation, we compute the voting and the cash-
flow rights of the ultimate owner. For this purpose, we use the last link principle method 
initially proposed by (La Porta et al., 1999).This method is described below.  
Voting Rights (VR) and Cash-Flow Rights (CFR) 
The controlling shareholder can control (hold) a bank directly and/or indirectly. The 
voting rights (cash-flow rights) of the controlling shareholder are the sum of direct and 
indirect control (ownership) in the bank. Direct control (ownership) involves shares registered 
in the controlling shareholder’s name. Indirect voting rights (cash-flow rights) involve bank 
shares held by entities that the ultimate owner controls.  
For example, assume that UO is the ultimate owner of bank B and the control chain from UO 
to B is a sequence of two other corporations C1 and C2 (each entity in the control chain holds 
10 per cent or more of voting rights over the next one). Assume UO holds 10% in C2, C2 
holds 20% in C1 which in turn holds 30% in the bank (B), i.e. the control chain is presented as 
follows    ሺ   ሻ   ሺ   ሻ   ሺ   ሻ  , indirect voting rights of UO computed on 
the basis of the last link principle method are equal to 30% whereas the cash-flow rights are 
equal to 0.6%, i.e. 10%*20%*30%. If the ultimate owner controls bank B through multiple 
chains, we sum the voting rights (cash-flow rights) across all of these chains. Suppose that 
UO controls (holds) directly an additional proportion of 40% in bank B, the voting rights of 
UO are equal to 70%, i.e.              whereas the cash flow-rights are 40.6%, i.e.               . If the bank is widely-held or in the case of cross holdings we set its 
voting rights (cash-flow rights) equal to zero. When multiple shareholders have 10% or more 
of the votes in the bank, we define the controlling shareholder as the owner with the greatest 
voting rights.  
Divergence between Voting and Cash-Flow Rights (WEDGE) 
Substantial discrepancies between voting and cash-flow rights may exist in the presence 
of indirect control chains. In our analysis we define the control-ownership deviation as the 
difference between the voting and the cash-flow rights (WEDGE) (La Porta et al., 1999). We 
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note W the dummy variable equal to one if WEDGE is not null, and zero otherwise. In the 
previous example, WEDGE is equal to 29.4%, i.e. 70%-40.6%. 
Appendix A reports some examples on the control chains and the calculation of the voting 
and the cash-flow rights using a 10% control threshold as well as a 20% control level.  
3.4 Ultimate Ownership in Western Europe and Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the composition of our sample according to ownership 
structure using a control threshold of 10%. Our data show that 89% of European commercial 
banks are controlled by at least one shareholder whereas widely-held banks account only for 
11%. This sample composition allows us to easily test our hypotheses. The data also suggest 
that the nature of controlling shareholders is diverse. On average, widely-held banks (BANK) 
control 38% of the banks in our sample. Further, individuals/families (FAMILY) and 
government (STATE) are important owners in our sample of European banks. They control 
21% and 14% of banks respectively. When we divide our sample in two subsamples 
depending on the presence or the absence of the separation between VR and CFR, we observe 
that more than 44% of the controlled banks have an owner with control-ownership deviation. 
Besides, we notice that FAMILY ownership and STATE ownership prevail in the subsample 
where the ultimate owner exerts control through control-ownership gap. They respectively 
control 27% and 24% of the banks with control-ownership divergence against 17% and 7% of 
the banks without such divergence. This finding is consistent with the view that divergence 
between control and ownership could enable ultimate owners and especially families to 
expropriate minority shareholders and divert a large fraction of resources (Almeida & 
Wolfenzon, 2006). In contrast, widely-held banks (BANK) control 53% of the banks without 
control-ownership deviation and only 19% of the banks with such a deviation. This is 
consistent with the view that widely-held banks are less likely to engage in expropriation as 
the resulting benefits are distributed among multiple owners and because regulation makes 
expropriation more costly (Haw et al., 2010).   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
On the whole, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 4 show that banks controlled 
through different rights hold lower Tier 1 risk-based capital ratios, are less profitable and rely 
more on credit activities. Furthermore, the proportion of banks with equal rights that pay 
dividends is higher than that of banks with different rights. The latter might pay lower 
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dividends to more easily adjust their capital ratios via internal funds, or because of the effect 
of expropriation (Faccio et al., 2001). Finally, our data show that on average, the ultimate 
owner holds almost 57% of equity capital (equivalent to 70% if we focus only on controlled-
banks) when the gap between both rights is zero. This high percentage (70%) is consistent 
with the presumption that a controlling shareholder with equal rights is more inclined toward 
profit maximization (Azofra & Santamaria, 2011). In contrast, a controlling shareholder with 
different rights holds on average around 19% (CFR) and controls 84% (VR). On average, the 
wedge between VR and CFR is 65%. These figures suggest that when there is a gap between 
both rights, the controlling shareholder is more inclined to protect her/his voting rights rather 
than her/his cash-flow rights as the latter are almost three times lower than the former.  
We now move to the approach we follow to investigate the impact of ownership structure 
and divergence between VR and CFR on banks' capital adjustments.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4 Methodology   
In this paper we aim to investigate how banks adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio depending 
on their control/ownership pattern. Banks have two main channels to adjust their capital 
ratios: the liability side, i.e. changes in capital and the asset side, i.e. adjustments in asset size 
or risk-weighted assets. To test our hypotheses, we adapt a capital adjustment model 
commonly used in the literature to focus only on adjustments through the liability side 
(changes in capital). We also introduce flexibility to allow for asymmetric upward and 
downward capital adjustment rates depending on the presence or absence of a gap between 
voting and cash-flow rights of banks’ ultimate owners. Asymmetries in capital adjustment 
rates possibly reflect differences in the cost of control dilution stemming from 
recapitalization. Hence, if a bank adjusts its capital at the same rate when it faces an upward 
or downward change, we would presume that such a bank does not fear control/ownership 
dilution. If a bank adjusts its capital at a lower rate when it needs to increase capital (upwards) 
than when it has to reduce it (downwards) we conjecture such a behavior is driven by the fear 
of control/ownership dilution and that the bank will most likely move to the target by 
adjusting the asset side of the balance sheet (by selling assets or reshuffling its asset portfolio 
by substituting safe assets to risky assets).         
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4.1 Baseline Capital Adjustment Model  
Based on previous studies ((Berger et al., 2008), (Byoun, 2008), (Flannery & Rangan, 
2006)), we consider the following capital partial adjustment model: 
      ̃       [(      )       ̃    ] (1) 
 
Where     refers to the book value of capital for bank i at time t, measured as Tier 1 
regulatory capital (T1).     is either bank total assets (TA) or risk-weighted assets (RWA). ቀ      ቁ  is the target (desired) Tier 1 simple (non risk-based) or risk-based capital ratio for 
bank i at time t, depending on the definition of     we consider.  ̃     is the adjustment 
model’s starting point. The right-hand side of equation (1) corresponds to the required change 
in bank capital to adjust to the target whereas the left-hand side is the observed change in 
bank capital, i.e. the amount of bank capital devoted to adjust to the target between t-1 and t. 
Hence, in this specification, the coefficient   represents the capital adjustment speed, i.e. the 
proportion a bank adjusts via capital changes to move to the target level.  
The observed change in bank capital in equation (1) can arise from passive management, i.e. 
shifting earnings to the stock of capital in the preceding period or active management, i.e. a 
change in dividend policy and equity issues/repurchases. To distinguish between these two 
alternatives, we consider two different definitions for  ̃    . First,  ̃     is defined as      , 
i.e. the lagged value of    . In this case, the left-hand side of equation (1) is the sum of both 
passive and active changes in bank capital (i.e. the whole change). The second definition for  ̃     allows us to isolate the active change in bank capital, i.e. equity issues/repurchases11.  ̃     is therefore computed as the sum of the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital (     ) 
and the current net income (    ) minus the current dividend payment (     ). Formally, 
considering this second definition   ̃     is computed as follows:  
  ̃                      (2)  
 
                                                          
11
 Note that in this study, active adjustment in bank capital refers to equity issues/repurchases solely and 
excludes the change in dividend policy (payout ratio). Our aim is to focus on external capital adjustment.  
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By dividing both sides of equation (1) by    , we specify the capital partial adjustment 
model as follows:  
                     (3)  
Where:               ̃        , the Actual Deviation and         ቀ      ቁ   ̃        , the Target 
Deviation.  
4.2 Ownership Augmented Capital Adjustment Model  
To test our hypotheses, we allow the capital adjustment speed ( ) in equation (3) to be 
asymmetric with regards to upward and downward adjustments depending on the presence or 
the absence of a deviation between the ultimate owner’s control and ownership. We therefore 
specify the following estimation model:  
       ሺ                                   ሻ            (4)  
Where           is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank needs to increase capital or 
decrease its assets (risk-weighted assets) to move toward the target, and zero otherwise.   is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is controlled by a shareholder with a gap between 
voting and cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise.  
The parameters   and     refer to banks with no divergence between control and 
ownership (   =0). They measure the proportion of capital used to adjust to the target either 
downwards (           ) or upwards (           ). Consistent with hypothesis 
(H1.a), we expect the parameters    and     to be positive and significant. If there is no fear 
of control/ownership dilution consistent with hypothesis H1.b we expect the coefficient   to 
be non-significantly different from zero, i.e. such banks devote the same proportion of capital 
to adjust to the target upwards and downwards. The coefficients      and           
respectively correspond to downward and upward adjustment rates of banks with control-
ownership wedge (   =1).  Consistent with hypothesis (H2), we expect the coefficient    to 
be statistically non-significant, i.e. banks with and without deviation between both rights 
adjust their capital at the same rate when they need to reduce it. If the controlling shareholder 
with control-ownership wedge fears the dilution of her/his control power, according to 
hypothesis (H3) the coefficient    is expected to be negative and significant. In the extreme 
case, the sum           could be equal to zero which would mean that banks with 
control-ownership wedge do not at all increase their capital to move to the target level.  
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Table B.1 in appendix B summarizes the expected sign and the relative magnitude of the 
adjustment speed under each case.  
4.3 Estimating the Target Capital Ratio   
We recall that ቀ      ቁ in equation (1) is not observable. Thus estimating the target capital 
ratio ቀ      ቁ  is a prerequisite to our analysis. We use several proxies to obtain fitted values of ቀ      ቁ .   
First, we use the following partial adjustment model:  
             ሺ   ሻ          (5)  
 
Where     is the book value of Tier 1 regulatory capital (   ) divided by either total assets 
(T1_TA) or risk-weighted assets (T1_RWA).   is the vector of coefficients to be estimated.   
is the speed of adjustment.       is the lagged Tier 1 capital ratio and     is the error term.        is the matrix of a set of observable variables commonly used in the previous literature 
on the determinants of optimal bank capital ratios. Table C.1 in Appendix C describes these 
variables.  
Second, we estimate ቀ      ቁ considering the following complete adjustment model:  
                (6)  
Where     is the error term.   
5 Results  
In this study, we aim to test for the presence of potential asymmetries in banks' capital 
adjustment depending on their ownership structure. We proceed in two steps. In the first step, 
we estimate the target capital ratio ቀ      ቁ . For this purpose, we use two models: a partial and a 
complete adjustment model. We estimate the partial adjustment model specified in equation 
(5) using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator developed for dynamic 
models by (Arellano & Bond, 1991). The complete adjustment model specified in equation 
(6) is estimated using random effects estimator. The results obtained for this first step are 
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reported in Table 5. Table D.1 in appendix D reports the correlation matrix of the explanatory 
variables used in this step. On the whole, the correlation coefficients are low. To deal with 
multi-colinearity issues, we orthogonalize the natural logarithm of assets (LN_TA) on charter 
value (CV) and the return on assets (ROA) on the cost of equity (COST_EQ).  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In the second step, we replace in equation (4) the target capital ratio ቀ      ቁ  by its fitted 
value obtained from the first step estimation, compute both the target deviation (     ) and 
the actual deviation (     ) and estimate equation (4) using fixed effects estimator12. Table 6 
reports the results obtained from this second step estimation. Panel A of Table 6 reports 
estimation results of equation (4) considering both passive and active components of bank 
capital. Panel B presents estimation results focusing only on the active variation in Tier 1 
capital.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We first interpret the results in Panel B. The parameters estimates   and     are both 
positive and highly significant. They range from 0.37 to 0.43 and from 0.39 to 0.47 
respectively. As expected, the coefficient   of the interaction term                 is 
statistically non-significant. These results confirm the predictions of hypotheses H1.a and 
H1.b. Banks controlled by a shareholder with equal rights adjust their capital upwards (   ) 
and downwards ( ) at the same rate (   ). Such banks actively manage their capital and fill 
almost half of the required change in capital through equity issues/repurchases. For banks 
controlled by a shareholder with a gap between both rights, the parameter estimate      
(downward adjustment) is highly significant and ranges from 0.33 to 0.48, while the 
parameter estimate           (upward adjustment) is significantly lower (between 0.04 
and 0.09). The Wald-test indicates that the latter is statistically non-significant. Consistent 
with hypothesis H2, such banks adjust their capital identically to banks without control-
ownership gap (    ) when they need to repurchase equity. Conversely, such banks are 
reluctant to actively adjust their position when they have to issue equity, possibly because of 
the fear of control dilution.           
                                                          
12
 We favor this estimator because previous studies (Gropp & Heider, 2011) argue that fixed effects contribute to 
explain the adjustment speed. We also perform the regressions using OLS and Random Effects estimators. The 
results, not reported here, are almost similar.  
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Regarding Panel A of Table 6 (both active and passive changes in bank capital) the results 
again show that banks controlled through equal rights (voting and cash-flow) symmetrically 
adjust their capital upwards and downwards (  and     are both positive and significant,   
is statistically non-significant). Banks controlled via discrepancy between both rights adjust 
their capital upwards (         ) and downwards (    ) although the upward 
adjustment rate is lower (24%-34% versus 42%-55% for downward adjustment). This finding 
suggests that such banks counterbalance their reluctance to actively adjust their capital 
upwards by passively managing their capital (i.e. earnings retention or a decrease in dividend 
payment). 
In summary, the results show that the dynamics of bank Tier 1 capital are actually 
influenced by the presence or absence of a deviation between the ultimate owner’s voting and 
cash-flow rights. Banks with equal rights of the ultimate owner are found to adjust their 
capital at the same rate regardless of their initial position (below or above the target level). 
Conversely, banks with deviation between voting and cash-flow rights significantly adjust 
their capital only when they need to reduce it to move closer to the target level. When the 
adjustment process requires an increase in capital, such banks tend to passively adjust their 
position, possibly because of the fear of control dilution. Our findings also indicate that such 
“specific” banks prevail in Europe (around 50% of the banks in our sample are controlled 
through deviation between both rights). Such institutions rely more on traditional 
intermediation activities (loans), and contribute up to 50% of total loans granted to the 
economy as a whole13. Our results suggest that to preserve their control, banks with 
divergence between voting and cash-flow rights are reluctant to actively manage their Tier 1 
regulatory capital upwards. Given this finding, we presume that such a behavior might be 
more pronounced under Basel III as the Basel Committee has narrowed the definition of Tier 
1 capital to ordinary shares only. Because such banks are less able to actively adjust their Tier 
1 capital without incurring changes in voting rights, they might increase their reliance on 
passive adjustments and asset downsizing. Given their prevalence in Europe and their 
important contribution to the economy as major lenders our findings have important policy 
implications.     
                                                          
13
 For more details se table E.1 in appendix E.   
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6 Deeper Investigation and Robustness Checks  
In this section, we first make some extensions to go deeper in our investigation and then 
carry out some robustness checks.  
6.1 Extensions  
Our main results support the conjecture that controlling shareholders with deviation 
between voting and cash-flow rights avoid recapitalization to preserve their control. We now 
go further by analyzing the conditions under which the fear of control dilution is more or less 
pronounced. We consider shareholder type and shareholder protection.  
Capital Adjustment and Ultimate Controlling Shareholder Type 
The fear of control dilution may be stronger if the controlling shareholder is a family or a 
state and weaker if the controlling shareholder is a bank or other categories. The literature 
argues that the deviation between both rights attracts families and states if these expect 
diverting higher resources (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006). Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) find 
that family-controlled firms avoid equity issuing methods that may dilute their control 
benefits or impose more monitoring on them. Thus, family and state controlled banks are 
expected to have significant incentives to influence capital adjustment decisions that could 
threaten their control position.  
To test this hypothesis, we split the full sample into two subsamples based on the type of 
the controlling shareholder. We isolate family and state ownership from other categories 
(BANK, OTHER). We run regressions separately on the two subsamples. The results 
regarding the estimation of the target capital ratio, not reported here, are similar to those 
previously obtained. The results for the adjustment speed on both subsamples are presented in 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2. For the subsample of banks controlled by a family or a state (Table 
7.1), the findings are almost similar to those previously obtained, i.e. unlike banks controlled 
by a shareholder with equal rights, banks controlled by a shareholder with a gap between both 
rights differently weigh increases and decreases in capital. Regarding the subsample of banks 
controlled by a bank or any other category (different from a family and a state), again, banks 
with no gap between both rights do not distinguish between increases and decreases in capital 
and adjust their capital in both cases. However, unlike the results obtained on the previous 
subsample (family or state), banks with deviation between VR and CFR adjust their capital 
- 19 - 
 
both upwards and downwards although the upward adjustment rate is lower. The results in 
Panel B of Table 7.2 show that the adjustment rate for such banks when they face a shortage 
in capital ranges from 10% to 20%. The Wald test indicates that this capital adjustment is 
significantly different from zero (except in column (1) Eq.6). These results are consistent with 
our predictions that family and state ultimate owners have stronger incentives protect their 
control compared to other categories.            
Capital Adjustment and Shareholder Protection  
We further test how shareholder protection rights may affect the relationship between 
capital adjustment and ownership structure. Expropriation is more likely to occur in countries 
with weak shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 2002). Hence, we conjecture that the 
controlling shareholder with different VR and CFR might be more reluctant to raise equity in 
countries with low shareholder protection. This is because control in such countries is more 
valuable in the sense that a controlling owner can divert significant resources and protect 
herself/himself from becoming a minority shareholder and suffer expropriation.   
To examine this hypothesis, we again split the full sample into two subsamples based on 
the cross-country median value of the shareholder protection index14. We perform regressions 
on these two subsamples. Estimating the target capital ratio, not reported here, again yields 
similar results as before. Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 illustrate respectively the estimation of 
equation (4) for the subsamples with weak and strong shareholder protection. The results 
reported in Table 8.1 confirm those previously obtained. Banks controlled through equal 
rights adjust their capital upwards and downwards at the same rate. However, in the presence 
of a gap between both rights, banks do adjust their capital downwards but are reluctant to 
adjust it upwards. The results shown in Table 8.2 indicate that banks with deviation between 
VR and CFR and established in countries with good shareholder protection adjust their capital 
even when they face a capital shortage. This result is consistent with our prediction: in 
countries with good shareholder protection the fear of control dilution is tempered, 
consequently banks with deviation between voting and cash-flow rights adjust their capital 
ratio upwards and downwards even though downward adjustment rate is higher.      
                                                          
14
 We consider the shareholder protection index as calculated in (La Porta et al., 1998).  
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6.2 Sensitivity analysis 
We perform several regressions to check the robustness of our results. Appendix F reports 
the estimation results15.  
First, we carry out the following robustness checks, still considering the control threshold 
of 10%.  
We focus on the sample of controlled banks, i.e. we exclude from the initial sample 40 
widely-held banks. This criterion leaves us with 402 European controlled banks. Regression 
results are shown in Table F.1. Then, we restrict our sample to listed banks. The results are 
shown in  
Table F.2.  In addition, we consider only a pre-crisis period and re-estimate the whole 
process for the 2002-2006 period. The estimation results are reported in Table F.3.  
Furthermore, we exclude from the initial sample observations for which the Tier 1 risk-based 
capital ratio is below the regulatory minimum ratio (4%). The results are shown in Table F.4. 
Finally, we re-estimate the target capital ratio considering the dummy variable that reflects the 
presence or absence of a gap between control and ownership (  ). This check is motivated by 
our finding that on average banks without a gap between both rights hold higher Tier 1 capital 
ratios than their counterparts (see table 4). The results obtained for the second step estimations 
are reported in Table F.5.   
In all cases, the results are consistent with those previously obtained for both steps. 
 Second, we change the control threshold and re-estimate all the regressions considering 
this new control level. We recalculate ownership variables considering a control level of 20% 
instead of 10%. This new minimum control threshold changes our database both 
quantitatively and qualitatively (see Table 3). First, we add some of the banks for which we 
fail to follow the track until the ultimate owner when we use a 10% control level. 
Accordingly, 22 banks16 are added to our sample reaching 464 banks corresponding to 2647 
observations. In addition, the structure of the initial sample has changed. The number of 
widely-held banks increases from 40 to 66 (178 additional observations). Furthermore, the 
nature of the ultimate owner is modified. For example, the number of family or state 
                                                          
15
 Note that in each case we re-estimate the target capital ratio (step 1) using the considered sample. The results, 
not reported here, are available on request. The results are almost identical for each sub-sample.  
16
 We are not able to end the process for 28 banks when we consider the 10% control threshold and for 6 banks 
with the 20% threshold.  
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controlled banks diminishes by 30 whereas the number of banks controlled by a bank 
increases by 46.  
 Table F.6 reports the estimation results when we use this new control threshold. The results 
remain unchanged and are consistent with those previously obtained.  
We also check the robustness of our results by performing further estimations using this new 
control threshold (20%). We consider the following samples (1) Controlled banks (2) Listed 
banks (3) 2002-2006 period and (4) Banks above the regulatory capital minimum. In all cases, 
our main results -not reported here- remain unchanged.   
7 Conclusion and Policy Implications   
The purpose of this study is to empirically test whether bank ownership characteristics, 
especially the separation between voting and cash-flow rights affect the bank’s decision to 
recapitalize. We specifically question whether banks with and without separation between 
both rights behave differently when they face a shortage or a surplus in capital. For this 
purpose, we assemble a novel hand-collected dataset on bank ultimate control and ownership 
structure and work on an unbalanced panel of 442 commercial banks across 17 European 
countries over the 2002-2010 period.  
On the whole, the results confirm the conjecture that the dynamics of equity capital, that is 
its adjustment to the target level, is different for banks controlled by a shareholder with or 
without deviation between voting and cash-flow rights. On the one hand, when there is no gap 
between both rights, banks equally adjust their capital upwards or downwards and do not 
appear to fear control dilution. On the other hand, when there is deviation between both 
rights, banks differently weigh the need to increase or decrease equity. They are reluctant to 
actively adjust their capital upwards to reach the target level. Our findings suggest that 
controlling shareholders with divergence between both rights curb recapitalization to preserve 
their control position and encourage equity repurchase to strengthen their voting power.   
Our findings have several policy implications. We show that during the 2002-2010 period 
covered by the Basel I and II accords, European banks with and without deviation between 
voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner behave differently when they adjust their 
Tier 1 regulatory capital to move to the target level. Consequently it is important for 
regulators and supervisors to consider that changes in capital requirements, particularly 
narrowing the definition of Tier 1 capital to ordinary shares, might impact banks differently 
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depending on their ownership pattern. According to our results, banks controlled by a 
shareholder with divergence between both rights are reluctant to raise equity that may dilute 
the voting power. Consequently, we presume that the propensity to adjust their Tier 1 capital 
ratio through alternative methods (i.e. reduce their dividend payment, proceed to downward 
adjustment in asset size or risk-weighted assets) other than raising equity might be higher 
under Basel III schemes because such banks have not only to raise new equity but also to use 
ordinary shares which, unlike preferred shares (in general carrying only cash-flow rights), 
may dilute the voting rights of the controlling shareholder. Hence, credit crunch phenomena 
are more likely to occur in the transition from Basel II to Basel III which is supposed to be 
completed in 2019. Such banks should be closely monitored by regulators and supervisors. A 
better disclosure of banks' ownership structures following the recommendations of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 2010b) should be encouraged to improve regulatory 
but also market monitoring and discipline.   
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Table 1 
Distribution of European Commercial Banks and Representativeness of the Sample  
Country  
 Banks available in Bankscope  Banks in the final sample 
 All Banks   Listed Banks   All Banks  Listed Banks  Per cent a 
Austria  88  5  18  3  42.81 
Belgium  50  2  11  1  98.43 
Denmark  61  42  45  35  93.80 
Finland  10  2  3  0  82.72 
France  191  18  25  6  79.42 
Germany  208  20  30  9  74.83 
Greece  19  11  13  9  96.47 
Ireland  35  5  15  4  96.70 
Italy  188  27  128  17  86.92 
Luxembourg  107  4  18  4  53.93 
Netherlands  47  5  22  4  63.02 
Norway  20  4  8  3  73.85 
Portugal  27  5  11  2  84.70 
Spain  92  17  18  10  91.71 
Sweeden  25  2  13  2  83.32 
Switzerland  182  7  15  3  87.21 
United Kingdom  183  9  49  5  72.16 
Total  1533  185  442  117  - 
a
 is the percentage of total assets of all commercial banks in our sample in the aggregate total assets of all 
commercial banks provided by Bankscope in a given country over the 2002-2010 period. 
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Table 2 
General Descriptive Statistics, on average over the 2002-2010 period  
 
TA DEP_TA TF_TA LO_TA LLP EQ_TA TCR T1_RWA ROA ROE MARG_TA 
Full sample of commercial banks in Bankscope (1533 banks) 
Mean 25268.59 69.31 80.45 47.92 0.73 14.25 19.95 17.00 0.70 6.89 1.22 
Median 1037.50 76.26 87.38 51.32 0.35 8.16 13.13 10.55 0.52 6.58 0.15 
Std. Dev. 120352.05 23.07 21.58 30.22 2.07 17.48 33.50 32.80 3.78 14.11 4.04 
Minimum 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 -19.23 0.00 0.10 -0.40 -56.54 -97.35 -14.56 
Maximum 2202423 150.18 850.00 99.96 17.81 100.00 877.00 753.00 75.50 79.77 48.91 
Final sample of commercial banks (442 banks) 
Mean 72333.56 65.38 85.57 55.18 0.77 9.16 14.33 12.34 0.60 7.20 0.54 
Median 4864.10 68.86 88.13 60.75 0.47 6.74 12.50 10.10 0.52 8.24 0.04 
Std. Dev. 213529.13 20.15 11.12 26.09 1.51 9.22 6.47 7.10 1.77 12.68 2.55 
Minimum 6.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 -19.23 0.00 0.10 0.10 -15.04 -90.70 -0.51 
Maximum 2202423 94.93 99.31 99.07 17.13 95.95 50.00 36.05 19.65 79.77 28.95 
All variables are expressed in percentage except TA which is in million Euros.  TA is the bank’s total asset. DEP_TA is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. TF_TA is the 
ratio of total funding to total asset.  LO_TA is the ratio of net loans to total asset. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans.  EQ_TA is the ratio of total equity to 
total asset. TCR is the risk-based total capital ratio. T1_RWA is the risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio. ROA is the return on asset. ROE is the return on equity. MARG_TA is the 
ratio of net interest margin to total asset. 
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Table 3 
Ultimate Ownership of European Commercial Banks 
This table reports Ultimate Ownership Structure for European commercial banks using a minimum control threshold of 10% (PANEL A) and 20% (PANEL B) for the whole sample (WHOLE 
SAMPLE) and the subsamples of banks controlled by a shareholder with equal voting and cash-flow rights (VR=CFR) and different rights (VR≠CFR). In columns (a), we report the percentage 
and the number of observations (between brackets) for each ownership category. In columns (b), we present the corresponding number of banks. WIDELY is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the bank is widely-held, and zero otherwise. CONTROLLED is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is controlled by at least one shareholder, and zero otherwise. BANK is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the bank is controlled by a bank, and zero otherwise. FAMILY is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is controlled by a family/individual, and zero otherwise. 
STATE is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is controlled by a state/public authority, and zero otherwise. OTHER is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is controlled by any of 
these categories: Industrial firm, financial and insurance companies, Mutual and Pension funds, Foundations and Research institutes, Managers or cross-holdings, and zero otherwise. 
 
  PANEL A: Control Threshold 10%  PANEL B: Control Threshold 20% 
 
  WHOLE SAMPLE  VR=CFR  VR ≠ CFR  WHOLE SAMPLE  VR=CFR  VR ≠ CFR 
 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
WIDELY 
 
11.54 
(297) 
 40  -  -  -  -  
17.94 
(475) 
 66  -  -  -  - 
CONTROLLED  
88.46 
 (2 277) 
 402  
55.78 
 (1 270) 
 215  
44.22 
 (1 007) 
 187  
82.06 
(2 172) 
 398  
57.41 
(1 247) 
 225  
42.59  
 (925) 
 173 
 
BANK  
38.29 
(872) 
 155  
53.46 
(679) 
 119  
19.16  
(193) 
 36  
51.70 
(1123) 
 201  
64.15 
 (800) 
 144  
34.91 
 (323) 
 57 
 
FAMILY  
21.82 
(497)  
 90  
17.16 
(218) 
 38  
27.70 
 (279) 
 52  
16.94 
 (368) 
 73  
13.15 
 (164) 
 31  
22.05 
 (204) 
 42 
 
STATE  
14.84 
(338) 
 65  
7.16 
 (91) 
 14  
24.52 
(247) 
 51  
11.74 
 (255) 
 52  
6.09 
 (76) 
 13  
19.35  
(179) 
 39 
 
OTHER  
25.05 
(570) 
 92  
22.22 
(282) 
 44  
28.62 
 (288) 
 48  
19.62 
 (426) 
 72  
16.61 
 (207) 
 37  
23.69  
(219) 
 35 
Total 
observations/banks 
 2574  442  1270  215  1007  187  2647  464  1247  225  925  173 
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Table 4 
 
Summary Statistics of the main variables over the 2002-2010 period  
 
Variables Number of 
 observations 
 Sample VR CFR   Sample VR ≠ CFR   T-test 
 Mean Median Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum   Mean Median Stan.dev Minimum Maximum 
    
TA 2573  78614.30 4470.70 238175.84 6.90 2202423 
 
64463.08 5623.30 171384.27 50.80 1967121.9 
 
1.63 
LO_TA 2563  52.52 55.98  24.14 0.00 98.87 
 
57.46 62.22 27.99 0.00 99.07 
 
-4.74*** 
ROA 2569  0.64 0.57 1.79 -15.04 19.65 
 
0.47 0.45 1.16 -10.60 7.78 
 
2.64*** 
ROE 2544  7.28 8.12 12.30 -90.70 79.77 
 
7.09 8.42 13.26 -78.82 64.41 
 
0.36*** 
LLP 2436  0.78 0.49 1.40 -7.32 17.13 
 
0.74 0.40 1.66 -19.23 13.33 
 
0.53 
NPL 1714  3.70 2.23 4.75 0.00 67.99 
 
4.26 2.45 6.32 0.00 64.04 
 
-2.06** 
MKT_DISC 2247  19.44 16.45 17.61 0.00 100.00 
 
17.00 10.59 19.33 0.00 96.83 
 
3.07*** 
DIV 2075  0.92 1.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
 
0.86 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
 
3.59*** 
TCR 2491  17.06 12.78 23.77 2.69 50.00 
 
16.58 12.31 31.07 0.10 48.03 
 
0.43 
T1_RWA 2511  12.71 10.54 7.45 1.87 36.05 
 
11.76 9.68 6.50 0.10 34.97 
 
3.28*** 
LISTED 2574  0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
 
- 
VR 2574  56.14 55.22 40.40 0.00 100.00 
 
84.76 98.82 22.01 15.95 100.00 
 
- 
CFR 2574  56.14 55.22 40.40 0.00 100.00 
 
18.97 23.29 29.18 2.81 99.98 
 
- 
WEDGE 2574  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   65.79 44.72 30.50 0.00 97.16   - 
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables for both subsamples of banks controlled by a shareholder with equal voting and cash-flow rights (VR=CFR) and different rights 
(VR≠CFR). All variables are expressed in percentage except TA which is in million euros.  TA is the bank’s total asset.  LO_TA is the ratio of net loans to total asset. ROA is 
the return on asset. ROE is the return on equity. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. MKT_DISC is 
the ratio of total long term funding to total funding. DIV is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the bank pays dividends at time t, and zero otherwise. TCR is the risk-based total 
capital ratio. T1_RWA is the risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio. LISTED is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. VR is the ultimate owner’s 
voting rights. CFR is the ultimate owner’s cash-flow rights. WEDGE is the difference between the ultimate owner’s voting (VR) and cash-flow rights (CFR). T-test is the test 
of mean differences.  
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Table 5 
 
Estimating the target capital ratio for the whole sample over the 2002-2010 period  
Dependent 
variable 
T1_TA  T1_RWA 
Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6 
a  b  a  b  a  b  a  b 
T1_TA t-1 0.59***  0.60***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)             
T1_RWA t-1 -  -  -  -  0.54***  0.54***  -  - 
 
 
 
   
 
  (0.00)  (0.00)     
LN_TA -0.28***  -0.35***  -1.31***  -1.62***  -0.73***  -0.74***  -1.37***  -1.57*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
ROA 0.64***  0.67***  0.14  0.13  0.69**  0.72**  0.02  0.02 
 
(0.01)  (0.00)  (0.65)  (0.71)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.94)  (0.92) 
LLP 0.06  0.07  -0.06  -0.10  -0.09  -0.09  0.04  0.03 
 
(0.16)  (0.14)  (0.61)  (0.48)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.82)  (0.88) 
COST_EQ -0.44***  -0.47***  -0.22**  -0.24**  -0.12  -0.12  0.01  0.01 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.59)  (0.56)  (0.94)  (0.94) 
CV 0.14*  0.15*  0.25**  0.25*  0.21*  0.22*  0.10  0.16 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.59)  (0.41) 
LO_TA 0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.03**  -0.04***  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.17)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
MKT_DISC 0.00  0.00  0.01*  0.01**  0.02**  0.02**  0.02**  0.02** 
 
(0.82)  (0.75)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
GDPG 0.05*  0.06*  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.06 
 
(0.09)  (0.08)  (0.62)  (0.40)  (0.84)  (0.89)  (0.54)  (0.29) 
LO_GR -0.01***  -0.01***  -0.01***  -0.01***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
BASEL2 0.35*  0.39**  0.73***  0.67**  2.17***  2.14***  3.25***  3.17*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
LISTED 0.25  0.32  1.54***  1.92***  0.99*  0.98*  0.89*  1.05* 
 
(0.16)  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.05) 
U_CAP -0.77  -  -1.88***  -  0.38  -  -1.28***  -2.47*** 
 
(0.18)    (0.00)    (0.39)    (0.00)  (0.00) 
A_CAP -0.61  -  -1.59***  -  -0.18  -  -1.45***  -1.45*** 
 
(0.15)    (0.00)    (0.53)    (0.00)  (0.00) 
CAP_INDEX -  -0.28*  -  -1.20**  -  -1.01***  -  - 
 
 
 (0.05)    (0.02)    (0.00)     
INTERCEPT 4.05***  5.56***  16.82***  24.91***  10.39***  16.61***  24.54***  39.80*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 Observations 1492  1492  1557  1557  1727  1727  1742  1742 
Hansen Test 120.0  121.5  -  -  168.0  170.5  -  - 
P-Value  0.15  0.13  -  -  0.24  0.20  -  - 
AR2 Test 0.27  0.08  -  -  -0.26  -0.24  -  - 
P-Value 0.78  0.93  -  -  0.79  0.81  -  - 
NB of banks  324  324  325  325  350  350  352  352 
 
Table 5 reports the estimation results for the target capital ratio (step 1) for the whole sample of European commercial banks 
over the 2002-2010 period. In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the target capital ratio using equations 5 
(GMM) and 6 (Random Effect Estimator). T1_TA t-1 is the lagged value of T1_TA defined as the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory 
capital (T1) to total asset (TA). T1_RWA t-1 is the lagged value of T1_ RWA defined as the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital 
(T1) to risk-weighted asset (RWA). LN_TA is the natural logarithm of bank’s total asset. ROA is profitability measured by 
the return on asset. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans. COST_EQ is the opportunity cost of equity measured 
by the return on equity. CV is the bank’s charter value measured as the ratio of bank deposits in total deposits of all banks in 
the country to which the subject bank belongs.  LO_TA is the ratio of net loans to total asset. MKT_DISC is the ratio of total 
long term funding to total funding. GDPG is the real gross domestic product growth. LO_GR is loan growth. BASEL2 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if year is greater than 2006, and zero otherwise. LISTED is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. U_CAP is a dummy variable equal to one if the risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio 
is less than or equal 4, and zero otherwise. A_CAP is a dummy variable equal to one if the risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio is 
between 4 and 7, and zero otherwise. CAP_INDEX is a regulatory capital index as defined in table C.1 in Appendix C. P-
values are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure for the whole sample over the 2002-
2010 period  
Dependent variable        
   
Panel A: active and passive changes  
in capital  
 
Panel B: active change in  
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.45***  0.43***  0.41***  0.39***  0.43***  0.41***  0.39***  0.37*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ 0.09  0.03  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.02 
 
(0.46)  (0.81)  (0.14)  (0.21)  (0.77)  (0.60)  (0.59)  (0.65)             ሺ  ሻ 0.10  0.05  0.11  0.03  0.05  0.02  -0.02  -0.04 
 
(0.31)  (0.57)  (0.10)  (0.26)  (0.66)  (0.42)  (0.73)  (0.51)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.39*  -0.27**  -0.25*  -0.18***  -0.46**  -0.42***  -0.34**  -0.26*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
INTERCEPT 0.30***  0.13  0.42***  0.15  0.09  0.14  0.09  -0.15** 
 
(0.00)  (0.36)  (0.00)  (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (0.28)  (0.01) 
Number of observations 1492  1492  1476  1485  1489  1485  1473  1479     0.54  0.46  0.48  0.43  0.47  0.44  0.43  0.39 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.55  0.48  0.52  0.42  0.48  0.43  0.37  0.33 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.25  0.24  0.34  0.28  0.06  0.04  0.07  0.09 
Risk level to reject               0.04  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.57  0.68  0.49  0.17 
 
Table 6 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator for the whole sample of European 
Commercial banks over the 2002-2010 period.                ̃       , is the actual deviation.        ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the 
target deviation.  ̃    , is defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in panel A and as the sum of the lagged 
value of Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current net income minus the current dividend payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the 
target capital ratio defined respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_TA) and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio 
(T1_RWA) in columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the target capital ratio using 
equations 5 (GMM) and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank capital 
ratio is below the target at t-1, and zero otherwise.   is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a gap between voting 
and cash-flow rights of the ultimate shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Table 7.1 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2010 period for banks 
controlled by a family or a state  
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive changes  
in capital 
 
Panel B: active change in  
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.49**  0.47***  0.45***  0.46***  0.42***  0.46**  0.39**  0.41** 
 
(0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)                  ሺ ሻ -0.03  -0.02  0.04  0.01  0.02  -0.03  0.05  0.04 
 
(0.47)  (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.34)  (0.75)  (0.88)  (0.33)  (0.11)             ሺ  ሻ 0.04  -0.01  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.03  0.07  0.05 
 
(0.91)  (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.20)  (0.24)  (0.16)  (0.64)  (0.30)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.21*  -0.19*  -0.24*  -0.20***  -0.42**  -0.44**  -0.50***  -0.49*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
INTERCEPT 0.52***  0.30  0.36**  0.28  0.25  0.29**  -0.02  -0.24 
 
(0.00)  (0.20)  (0.03)  (0.23)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.91)  (0.23) 
Number of observations 428  427  420  418  427  422  420  416     0.46  0.45  0.49  0.47  0.44  0.43  0.44  0.45 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.53  0.44  0.46  0.51  0.43  0.49  0.46  0.46 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.29  0.25  0.26  0.32  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Risk level to reject               0.02  0.08  0.03  0.00  0.87  0.48  0.89  0.78 
 
Table 7.1 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator for a subsample of European Commercial 
banks controlled by a family or a state over the 2002-2010 period.                ̃       , is the actual deviation.                   ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target deviation.  ̃     is defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in panel A, 
and as is the sum of the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current net income minus the current dividend 
payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital ratio defined respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_TA) and 
risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the 
target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the bank capital ratio is below the target at t-1, and zero otherwise.   is a dummy variable equal to one if there is 
a gap between voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-values are shown in 
parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7.2 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2010 period for banks 
controlled by other categories than "family" and "state" 
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive changes  
in capital  
Panel B: active change in  
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.47***  0.42***  0.37***  0.34***  0.50***  0.47***  0.40***  0.34*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ 0.10  0.05  0.08  0.05  0.02  -0.02  0.03  -0.01 
 
(0.41)  (0.41)  (0.37)  (0.10)  (0.58)  (0.50)  (0.59)  (0.00)             ሺ  ሻ 0.09  0.10  0.13  0.05  0.04  0.01  -0.10  -0.05 
 
(0.19)  (0.38)  (0.92)  (0.00)  (0.44)  (0.16)  (0.83)  (0.17)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.17  -0.30*  -0.22  -0.16  -0.38  -0.36*  -0.14  -0.08 
 
(0.74)  (0.08)  (0.26)  (0.00)  (0.52)  (0.09)  (0.50)  (0.19) 
INTERCEPT 0.24***  0.10  0.43***  0.13  0.12  0.08  0.10  -0.34*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.53)  (0.00)  (0.36)  (0.10)  (0.42)  (0.30)  (0.00) 
Number of observations 1064  1056  1056  1067  1062  1052  1053  1063     0.57  0.47  0.46  0.39  0.52  0.45  0.43  0.33 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  7.20  0.00  0.00      0.56  0.52  0.50  0.39  0.54  0.48  0.30  0.29 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.30  0.27  0.36  0.28  0.18  0.10  0.19  0.20 
Risk level to reject               0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.11  0.08  0.00 
 
Table 7.2 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator for a subsample of European Commercial 
banks controlled by a bank or another category different from a family or a state over the 2002-2010 period.                              ̃       , is the actual deviation.        ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target deviation.  ̃     is defined as the lagged 
value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in panel A, and as is the sum of the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current 
net income minus the current dividend payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital ratio defined respectively as the non-
weighted Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_TA) and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 
and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a dummy variable equal to one if the capital ratio is below the target at t-1, and zero otherwise.   is a 
dummy variable equal to one if there is a gap between voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate shareholder, and zero 
otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8.1 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2010 period for banks 
headquartered in countries with weak shareholder protection 
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive changes  
in capital  
Panel B: active change in  
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.43***  0.41***  0.39***  0.38***  0.42***  0.39***  0.36***  0.35*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ 0.07  0.04  0.05  0.02  -0.02  0.04  0.05  0.02 
 
(0.21)  (0.51)  (0.85)  (0.50)  (0.19)  (0.39)  (0.24)  (0.21)             ሺ  ሻ 0.09  0.04  0.08  0.02  0.03  0.01  -0.01  -0.03 
 
(0.20)  (0.26)  (0.31)  (0.00)  (0.27)  (0.48)  (0.19)  (0.23)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.38***  -0.29*  -0.27**  -0.18***  -0.41**  -0.43***  -0.39***  -0.32** 
 
(0.00)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
INTERCEPT 0.51***  0.16  0.60***  0.15  0.17**  0.16  0.32***  -0.26* 
 
(0.00)  (0.42)  (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.02)  (0.18)  (0.00)  (0.06) 
Number of observations 1094  1076  1079  1084  1092  1072  1077  1082     0.50  0.45  0.44  0.40  0.40  0.43  0.41  0.37 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.52  0.45  0.47  0.40  0.45  0.40  0.35  0.32 
Risk level to reject        0.00  8.68  4.57  4.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.21  0.20  0.25  0.24  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Risk level to reject               0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.46  0.65  0.71  0.39 
 
Table 8.1 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator for a subsample of European Commercial 
banks headquartered in countries with weak shareholder protection (the shareholder index is less than the median value) over 
the 2002-2010 period.                ̃       , is the actual deviation.        ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target deviation.  ̃     is 
defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in panel A, and as is the sum of the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory 
capital and the current net income minus the current dividend payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital ratio defined 
respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_TA) and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in columns (1) 
and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) and 6 (Random 
Effect Estimator).           is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank capital ratio is below the target at t-1, and 
zero otherwise.   is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a gap between voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate 
shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8.2 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2010 period for banks 
headquartered in countries with strong shareholder protection 
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive 
changes in capital 
 
 
Panel B: active change in  
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.46**  0.44**  0.42***  0.40***  0.44***  0.42***  0.40*  0.38*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ 0.11  0.04  0.09  0.06  0.08  0.03  0.05  0.02 
 
(0.22)  (0.63)  (0.11)  (0.41)  (0.13)  (0.76)  (0.67)  (0.32)             ሺ  ሻ 0.12  0.08  0.13  0.04  0.06  0.05  -0.01  -0.03 
 
(0.31)  (0.84)  (0.87)  (0.36)  (0.21)  (0.13)  (0.95)  (0.25)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.39  -0.24  -0.28  -0.20***  -0.38***  -0.32**  -0.28***  -0.17*** 
 
(0.87)  (0.33)  (0.45)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.03  0.23*  -0.05  0.08  0.00  0.20**  -0.47***  -0.25** 
 
(0.70)  (0.07)  (0.74)  (0.51)  (0.93)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Number of observations 398  404  397  401  397  399  396  397     0.57  0.48  0.51  0.46  0.52  0.45  0.45  0.40 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.58  0.52  0.55  0.44  0.50  0.47  0.39  0.35 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.30  0.32  0.36  0.32  0.20  0.18  0.16  0.20 
Risk level to reject               0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.00 
 
Table 8.2 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator for a subsample of European Commercial 
banks headquartered in countries with strong shareholder protection (the shareholder index is greater than or equal to the 
median value) over the 2002-2010 period.                ̃       , is the actual deviation.        ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target 
deviation.  ̃     is defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in panel A, and as is the sum of the lagged value of 
Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current net income minus the current dividend payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital 
ratio defined respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_TA) and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in 
columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) 
and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank capital ratio is below the 
target at t-1, and zero otherwise.   is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a gap between voting and cash-flow rights 
of the ultimate shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
36 
 
 
Examples of control chains  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank 
AG 
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE (51.78%) BANK TEJARAT (19.03%) 
GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (100%) 
EDALAT STOCK AGENCY (40%) 42.81% 
Control level 20% Control level 10% 
Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank 
AG 
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE (51.78%) 
GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (100%) 
The ultimate owner is “GOVERNMENT OF IRAN”. It is a multiple holding because UO 
controls the bank through “BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE” and “BANK TEJARAT”.  
VR=51.78+19.03=70.81 
CFR=100%*51.78%+42.81%*19.03%=59.92% 
WEDGE=70.81-59.92=10.89% 
 
The ultimate owner is “GOVERNMENT OF IRAN”.  
VR=51.78% 
CFR=100%*51.78%=51.78% 
WEDGE=51.78-51.78=0  
 
Figure A.1: the control chain of Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank 
APPENDIX A  
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Dexia Crédit Local 
SA 
CAISSE DES DÉPÔTS ET CONSIGNATIONS-
GROUPE CAISSE DES DÉPÔTS (17.61%) 
DEXIA (100%) 
HOLDING COMMUNAL SA-
GEMEENTELIJKE HOLDING NV (14.51%) 
ARCOFIN 
(14.25%) 
ARCOPAR 
(14.09%) 
GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE 
(98%) 
54.95% 
APPENDIX A (Continued) 
The ultimate owner is “GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE”. It is a pyramid.  
VR=100% 
CFR=100%*17.61%*98%=17.25% 
WEDGE=100%-17.25%=82.75% 
 
Dexia Crédit Local SA 
DEXIA (100%) 
The ultimate owner is “DEXIA” bank.  
VR=100% 
CFR=100% 
WEDGE=0% 
 
Control level 20% Control level 10% 
Figure A.2: the control chain of Dexia Crédit Local SA bank 
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Fortis Banque (Suisse) SA 
BGL BNP PARIBAS (100%) 
FORTIS BANK SA/ NV-BNP PARIBAS FORTIS (50%) STATE OF LUXEMBOURG (34%) 
BNP PARIBAS (98%) 
FEDERALE PARTICIPATIE- EN INVESTE- RINGSMAATSCHAPPIJ 
(10.78%) 
ETAT BELGE (100%) 
The ultimate owner is “ETAT BELGE”. It is a pyramid.  
VR=100% 
CFR=100%*50%*98%*10.78%*100%=5.28% 
WEDGE=100%-5.28%=94.72% 
 
Fortis Banque (Suisse) SA 
BGL BNP PARIBAS (100%) 
FORTIS BANK SA/ NV-BNP PARIBAS FORTIS (50%) STATE OF LUXEMBOURG (34%) 
BNP PARIBAS (98%) 
The ultimate owner is “BNP PARIBAS” bank. It is a pyramid.  
VR=100% 
CFR=100%*50%*98%=49% 
WEDGE=100%-49%=51% 
 
Control level 20% Control level 10% 
Figure A.3: the control chain of Fortis Banque (Suisse) SA bank 
 
APPENDIX A (Continued) 
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UNICREDIT SPA (99.99%) 
 
GENERALI 
VERSICHERUNG AG 
(49.3%)  
BKS 2000 - 
BETEILIGUNGSVERWALTU
NGSGESELLSCHAFT MBH 
(16.4%) 
BTV 2000 
BETEILIGUNGSVERWALTUN
GSGESELLSCHAFT M.B.H. 
(16.39%) 
CABO 
BETEILIGUNGSGESELLSCHAFT 
M.B.H. (32.54%) 
BKS Bank AG 
CABET-HOLDING-AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (100%) 
UNICREDIT BANK AUSTRIA AG (100%) 
 
Oberbank AG 
BANK FOR TIROL UND 
VORARLBERG AG-BTV (3 BANKEN 
GRUPPE) (18.51%) 
GENERALI 3BANKEN 
HOLDING AG (15.12%) 
19
.54%
 
29.64% 
39.4% 
18
.51%
 
19
.65%
 
15
.1%
 
14
.69%
 
15.41% 
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UNICREDIT SPA 
(99.99%) 
CABO BETEILIGUNGSGESELLSCHAFT 
M.B.H. (32.54%) 
CABET-HOLDING-
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (100%) 
UNICREDIT BANK 
AUSTRIA AG (100%) 
Oberbank AG 
Control level 20% Control level 10% 
Figure A.4: the control chain of OBERBANK AG bank  
 
The ultimate owner is “UNICREDIT SPA” bank. It is a pyramid.  
VR=32.54% 
CFR=32.54%*100%*100%*99.99%=32.53% 
WEDGE=32.54%-32.53%=1% 
 
It is a cross-holding.  
V=0 
CFR=0 
WEDGE=0 
APPENDIX A (Continued) 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B.1 
Expected signs and magnitudes of capital adjustment speeds 
 
       ሺ                                   ሻ                   ሺ ሻ 
 
 
 
Downward adjustment   Upward adjustment            = 0             = 1    = 0  significant  positive and significant   positive and non-significant  
    ' positive  and significant  ' non-significant  ' negative and significant Extreme case: ' + ' is non-significant 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C.1 
Description of the variables used to estimate the target capital ratio 
Variable Description Source 
Expected 
sign 
Authors 
LN_TA Natural logarithm of total assets Bankscope Negative (-) (Brewer et al., 2008), (Gropp & Heider, 2011) 
ROA Net income to total asset ratio Bankscope Ambiguous (+/-) (Flannery & Rangan, 2008), (Marcus, 1983), (Ayuso 
et al., 2004), (Gropp & Heider, 2011) 
LLP Loan loss provisions to net loans ratio Bankscope Ambiguous (+/-) (Ayuso et al., 2004), (Nier & Baumann, 2006), (Gropp 
& Heider, 2011). 
COST_EQ Net income to equity ratio Bankscope Ambiguous (+/-) (Ayuso et al., 2004), (Berger et al., 1995), (Nier & 
Baumann, 2006) 
CV Charter value defined as the ratio of bank deposits in total deposits of all 
banks in a given country 
Bankscope Ambiguous (+/-) (Fonseca & González, 2010), (Gropp & Heider, 2011), 
(Berger et al., 2008) 
LO_TA Net loans to total asset ratio Bankscope Negative (-) (Ayuso et al., 2004) 
MKT_DISC Market discipline variable defined as total long term market funding to 
total funding ratio 
Bankscope Positive (+) (Nier & Baumann, 2006) 
GDPG Real Growth Domestic Product World bank database Ambiguous (+/-) (Ayuso et al., 2004), (Jokipii & Milne, 2008), (Nier & 
Baumann, 2006), (Berger et al., 1995) 
LO_GR 
BASEL2 
Loan growth 
Dummy equal to one if year is greater than 2006, and 0 otherwise 
Bankscope 
Author’s definition 
Ambiguous (+/-) 
Positive (+) 
(Shehzad et al., 2010) 
Authors’ calculation 
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LISTED Dummy equal to one if the bank is listed, and 0 otherwise  Bankscope Ambiguous (+/-) (Shehzad et al., 2010) 
U_CAP Dummy equal to one if Tier 1 risk based capital ratio is lower or equal to 
4%, and 0 otherwise 
Bankscope Negative (-) (Rime, 2001), (Jokipii & Milne, 2011), (Jacques & 
Nigro, 1997) 
A_CAP Dummy equal to one if Tier 1 risk based capital ratio is between 4 and 
7%, and 0 otherwise 
Bankscope Negative (-) (Rime, 2001), (Jokipii & Milne, 2011), (Jacques & 
Nigro, 1997) 
CAP_INDEX Capital index which is the total number of affirmative answers to eleven 
questions17 
(Barth et al., 2004) 
database 
 
Positive (+) (Shehzad et al., 2010), (Laeven & Levine, 2009) 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Q1: Is the minimum capital ratio in line with the Basel guidelines? Q2: Does the minimum capital ratio vary as a function of market risk? Q3: Does the minimum capital 
ratio vary as a function of credit risk? Q4: Does the minimum capital ratio vary as a function of operational risk? Q5: Is there a simple leverage ratio that is required? Q6: Is 
market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted from the book value of capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined? Q7: Are unrealized 
losses in securities portfolios deducted from the book value of capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined? Q8: Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted 
from the book value of capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined? Q9: Are accounting practices for banks in accordance with International Accounting 
Standards (IAS)? Q10: Is subordinated debt allowed as part of regulatory capital? Q11: Is subordinated debt required as part of regulatory capital? 
 
Table C.1 (Continued) 
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APPENDIX D 
Table D.1 
 
Correlation matrix of the main explanatory variables used to estimate the target capital ratio 
 
LN_TA LO_TA ROA COST_EQ LLP MKT_DISC LO_GR CV GDPG BASEL2 LISTED U_CAP A_CAP CAP_INDEX 
LN_TA 1.00 
          
   
LO_TA -0.02 1.00 
         
   
ROA -0.09 -0.04 1.00 
        
   
COST_EQ 0.12 -0.01 0.72 1.00 
       
   
LLP -0.08 0.03 -0.23 -0.24 1.00 
      
   
MKT_DISC 0.13 0.23 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 1.00 
     
   
LO_GR -0.10 0.18 0.11 0.14 -0.14 0.00 1.00 
    
   
CV 0.60 -0.08 -0.03 0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 1.00 
   
   
GDPG 0.05 -0.01 0.17 0.27 -0.26 -0.03 0.21 0.13 1.00 
  
   
BASEL2 0.06 0.00 -0.09 -0.12 0.10 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.25 1.00 
 
   
LISTED 0.27 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.25 0.09 -0.08 1.00    
U_CAP 0.19 -0.19 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.24 -0.06 0.13 0.02 1.00   
A_CAP 0.18 0.21 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.07 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.10 0.06 -0.27 1.00  
CAP_INDEX 0.15 -0.11 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.07 0.05 1.00 
LN_TA is the natural logarithm of bank’s total asset. LO_TA is the ratio of net loans to total asset. ROA is profitability measured by the return on asset. COST_EQ is the 
opportunity cost of equity measured by the return on equity. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans. MKT_DISC is the ratio of total long term funding to total 
funding. LO_GR is loan growth. CV is the bank’s charter value measured as the share of bank deposits in total deposits of all banks in a given country. GDPG is the real 
Gross domestic product growth. BASEL2 is a dummy variable that takes the value one if year is greater to 2006, and zero otherwise. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. U_CAP is a dummy variable equal to one if the risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio is less than or equal 4, and zero otherwise. A_CAP is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio is between 4 and 7, and zero otherwise. CAP_INDEX is a regulatory capital index as defined in Table C.1.  
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APPEDIX E 
Table E.1 
Loans of European commercial banks and the proportion of total loans of sample banks 
in total loans of all commercial banks available in Bankscope by country  
Country 
 
Commercial Banks 
available in Bankscope  
Commercial Banks in the final sample 
 
Loans 
 Banks with wedge  Banks without wedge 
 
 Loans   Per cent a   Loans   Per cent a 
Austria   131550.80  21454.89  0.16  29040.48  0.22 
Belgium   514323.90  445577.09  0.87  63650.83  0.12 
Denmark   477270.00  394232.14  0.83  44727.45  0.09 
Finland   105520.10  83157.88  0.79  184.27  0.00 
France   1649908.00  545681.05  0.33  769708.36  0.47 
Germany   1350270.00  719554.39  0.53  209164.20  0.15 
Greece   202621.80  93066.05  0.46  102861.95  0.51 
Ireland   444870.70  1590.48  0.00  446800.36  1.00 
Italy   1900353.00  679888.37  0.36  964233.78  0.51 
Luxembourg   159875.90  73036.14  0.46  34944.70  0.22 
Netherlands   1347776.00  394729.16  0.29  500981.22  0.37 
Norway   181535.50  126625.49  0.70  2923.40  0.02 
Portugal   138297.50  7963.75  0.06  107902.20  0.78 
Spain   1330837.00  274207.22  0.21  944216.41  0.71 
Sweeden   286477.20  470.35  0.00  231430.02  0.81 
Switzerland   544670.60  11623.94  0.02  388547.82  0.71 
United Kingdom   2900402.00  1974273.54  0.68  428936.23  0.15 
Total  13666560.00  5847131.95  0.43  5270253.66  0.39 
 
a is the proportion of loans of a commercial bank with or without wedge in total loans of all commercial banks 
provided in Bankscope in a given country.  
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APPENDIX F  
Table F.1 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2010 period for 
controlled banks  
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive changes  
in capital 
 
Panel B: active change  
in capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.49***  0.47***  0.40***  0.37***  0.46***  0.43***  0.39***  0.38*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ 0.02  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.02 
 
(0.90)  (0.82)  (0.37)  (0.00)  (0.97)  (0.65)  (0.75)  (0.74)             ሺ  ሻ 0.07  -0.04  0.11  0.05  0.05  0.05  -0.00  0.04 
 
(0.57)  (0.68)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.69)  (0.56)  (0.91)  (0.47)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.37  -0.17  -0.31  -0.18**  -0.47*  -0.46***  -0.37***  -0.36*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.49)  (0.13)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
INTERCEPT 0.35***  0.11  0.46***  0.20  0.13*  0.15*  0.13  -0.26** 
 
(0.00)  (0.48)  (0.00)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.21)  (0.03) 
Number of observations 1259  1263  1243  1249  1256  1254  1240  1243     0.51  0.50  0.48  0.40  0.47  0.46  0.42  0.40 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.56  0.43  0.51  0.42  0.51  0.48  0.39  0.42 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.22  0.29  0.28  0.27  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.08 
Risk level to reject               0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.70  0.19  0.58  0.75 
 
Table F.1 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator for a subsample of European Commercial 
controlled banks over the 2002-2010 period.                ̃       , is the actual deviation.        ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target 
deviation.  ̃     is defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in panel A, and as is the sum of the lagged value of 
Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current net income minus the current dividend payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital 
ratio defined respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_TA) and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in 
columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) 
and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank capital ratio is below the 
target at t-1, and zero otherwise.   is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a gap between voting and cash-flow rights 
of the ultimate shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table F.2 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2010 period for listed 
banks  
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive changes  
in capital 
 
Panel B: active change in  
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.49***  0.47***  0.44**  0.45***  0.46***  0.45***  0.38***  0.41*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ -0.03  -0.04  0.05  0.05  0.04  -0.01  0.06  0.02 
 
(0.56)  (0.34)  (0.59)  (0.55)  (0.39)  (0.18)  (0.67)  (0.29)             ሺ  ሻ 0.04  0.02  0.02  0.05  -0.01  -0.02  0.04  0.02 
 
(0.43)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.58)  (0.10)  (0.51)  (0.46)  (0.26)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.23**  -0.19*  -0.16**  -0.23*  -0.42**  -0.36**  -0.40***  -0.40** 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
INTERCEPT 0.27***  0.81***  0.02  -0.07  -0.07  0.09  -0.43***  -0.33*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.96)  (0.55)  (0.30)  (0.20)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Number of observations 629  635  630  635  629  630  630  631     0.46  0.43  0.49  0.50  0.50  0.44  0.44  0.43 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.53  0.49  0.46  0.50  0.45  0.43  0.42  0.43 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.27  0.26  0.30  0.32  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.05 
Risk level to reject               0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.21  0.32  0.20  0.48 
 
Table F.2 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator for a subsample of European Commercial 
listed banks over the 2002-2010 period.                ̃       , is the actual deviation.        ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target 
deviation.  ̃     is defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in panel A, and as is the sum of the lagged value of 
Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current net income minus the current dividend payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital 
ratio defined respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_TA) and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in 
columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) 
and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank capital ratio is below the 
target at t-1, and zero otherwise.   is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a gap between voting and cash-flow rights 
of the ultimate shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table F.3 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2006 period  
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive changes  
in capital 
 
Panel B: active change in  
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.47***  0.45***  0.39***  0.40***  0.46***  0.45***  0.42***  0.38*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ -0.02  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.04 
 
(0.34)  (0.24)  (0.87)  (0.33)  (0.56)  (0.68)  (0.88)  (0.42)             ሺ  ሻ 0.06  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.04 
 
(0.75)  (0.59)  (0.74)  (0.37)  (0.99)  (0.39)  (0.73)  (0.48)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.20  -0.21  -0.16**  -0.13*  -0.45***  -0.46***  -0.42***  -0.43*** 
 
(0.33)  (0.12)  (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
INTERCEPT 0.55***  0.46  0.94***  -0.13  0.28**  0.61***  0.52***  -0.50*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.47)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Number of observations 620  631  609  623  618  629  608  624     0.45  0.41  0.36  0.37  0.51  0.48  0.44  0.42 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.53  0.50  0.43  0.43  0.46  0.48  0.45  0.42 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.45           0.31  0.25  0.24  0.27  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.03 
Risk level to reject               0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.45  0.79  0.36  0.55 
 
Table F.3 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator for the whole sample of European 
Commercial over the period 2002-2006.                ̃       , is the actual deviation.        ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target 
deviation.  ̃     is defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in panel A, and as is the sum of the lagged value of 
Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current net income minus the current dividend payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital 
ratio defined respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_TA) and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in 
columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) 
and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank capital ratio is below the 
target at t-1, and zero otherwise.   is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a gap between voting and cash-flow rights 
of the ultimate shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table F.4 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2010 period for banks 
above the regulatory capital requirement 
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive changes  
in capital 
 
Panel B: active change in  
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.44***  0.43***  0.40***  0.42***  0.42***  0.39***  0.39***  0.37*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ 0.01  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.05  0.03 
 
(0.30)  (0.53)  (0.12)  (0.29)  (0.40)  (0.29)  (0.57)  (0.35)             ሺ  ሻ 0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.06  0.04  -0.02  0.01 
 
(0.34)  (0.38)  (0.19)  (0.52)  (0.60)  (0.48)  (0.73)  (0.45)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.21  -0.17*  -0.17**  -0.17*  -0.42**  -0.38***  -0.38**  -0.35*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.00) 
INTERCEPT 0.26***  0.14  0.43***  0.183  0.07  0.12  0.10  -0.33*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.134)  (0.27)  (0.17)  (0.24)  (0.00) 
Number of observations 1488  1485  1472  1477  1485  1477  1469  1472     0.45  0.46  0.41  0.44  0.43  0.41  0.44  0.40 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.45  0.44  0.42  0.44  0.48  0.43  0.37  0.38 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.25  0.30  0.26  0.29  0.07  0.07  0.04  0.06 
Risk level to reject               0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.16  0.60  0.23 
 
Table F.4 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator on the subsample of European 
Commercial banks above the regulatory capital minimum over the 2002-2010 period.                ̃       , is the actual 
deviation.        ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target deviation.  ̃     is defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in 
panel A, and as is the sum of the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current net income minus the current 
dividend payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital ratio defined respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio 
(T1_TA) and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively 
estimate the target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the bank capital ratio is below the target at t-1, and zero otherwise.    is a dummy variable 
equal to one if there is a gap between voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-values 
are shown in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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  Table F.5 
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2010 period for the 
whole sample using a target capital ratio that controls for ownership structure    
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive changes  
in capital 
 
Panel B: active change in  
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.45***  0.46***  0.47***  0.45***  0.43***  0.40***  0.39***  0.42*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ 0.01  0.03  -0.01  0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.03  -0.01 
 
(0.15)  (0.27)  (0.39)  (0.36)  (0.26)  (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.43)             ሺ  ሻ 0.02  0.04  0.03  0.04  -0.01  0.01  0.03  -0.02 
 
(0.17)  (0.37)  (0.10)  (0.32)  (0.22)  (0.32)  (0.20)  (0.21)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.24  -0.25**  -0.22  -0.23*  -0.35**  -0.34***  -0.35*  -0.30*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.06)  (0.26)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.00) 
INTERCEPT 0.21***  0.32**  0.23*  0.25  0.20  0.12  0.11  0.12*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.20)  (0.26)  (0.31)  (0.29)  (0.00) 
Number of observations 1492  1492  1476  1485  1489  1485  1473  1479     0.46  0.49  0.46  0.47  0.44  0.39  0.42  0.41 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.47  0.50  0.50  0.49  0.42  0.41  0.42  0.40 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.31  0.27  0.27  0.28  0.08  0.06  0.10  0.09 
Risk level to reject               0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.42  0.46  0.18  0.39 
 
Table F.6 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator for the whole sample of European 
Commercial over the period 2002-2010 using a target capital ratio that controls for ownership structure.                ̃       , 
is the actual deviation.        ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target deviation.  ̃     is defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory 
capital in panel A, and as is the sum of the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current net income minus the 
current dividend payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital ratio defined respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital 
ratio (T1_TA) and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we 
respectively estimate the target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the bank capital ratio is below the target at t-1, and zero otherwise.    is a dummy 
variable equal to one if there is a gap between voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-
values are shown in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table F.6   
Capital adjustment speed and ownership structure over the 2002-2010 period for the 
whole sample using a 20% control threshold   
Dependent variable       
   
Panel A: active and passive changes 
in capital 
 
Panel B: active change in 
capital 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.5  Eq.6        ሺ  ሻ 0.46***  0.46***  0.44***  0.43***  0.41***  0.37***  0.39***  0.40*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                  ሺ ሻ 0.05  0.02  0.08  0.06  -0.01  0.03  0.02  0.01 
 
(0.55)  (0.15)  (0.25)  (0.63)  (0.39)  (0.31)  (0.21)  (0.18)             ሺ  ሻ 0.06  0.03  0.06  0.06  -0.03  0.02  -0.01  0.01 
 
(0.68)  (0.72)  (0.51)  (0.26)  (0.31)  (0.20)  (0.12)  (0.12)                     ሺ  ሻ -0.26*  -0.24  -0.29  -0.25**  -0.32**  -0.38***  -0.32**  -0.35*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.38)  (0.67)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.47) 
INTERCEPT 0.33***  0.29***  0.31***  0.20  0.07  -0.06  -0.01  -0.26** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.11)  (0.18)  (0.38)  (0.87)  (0.02) 
Number of observations 1522  1524  1507  1513  1518  1514  1503  1506     0.51  0.48  0.52  0.49  0.40  0.40  0.41  0.41 
Risk level to reject     =0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      0.52  0.49  0.50  0.49  0.38  0.39  0.38  0.41 
Risk level to reject        0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00           0.31  0.27  0.29  0.30  0.05  0.04  0.08  0.07 
Risk level to reject               0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.58  0.56  0.67  0.60 
 
Table F.5 reports the estimation results for equation (4) using fixed effect estimator on the whole sample of European 
Commercial using a 20% control threshold over the 2002-2010 period.                ̃       , is the actual deviation.            ቀ      ቁ   ̃       , is the target deviation.  ̃     is defined as the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital in panel A, 
and as is the sum of the lagged value of Tier 1 regulatory capital and the current net income minus the current dividend 
payment in panel B. ቀ      ቁ is the target capital ratio defined respectively as the non-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_TA) and 
risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio (T1_RWA) in columns (1) and (2). In columns Eq.5 and Eq.6, we respectively estimate the 
target capital ratio using equations 5 (GMM) and 6 (Random Effect Estimator).           is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the bank capital ratio is below the target at t-1, and zero otherwise.   is a dummy variable equal to one if there is 
a gap between voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate shareholder, and zero otherwise. P-values are shown in 
parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
